For a decade or more, proponents of the royalty-stacking conjecture have claimed that, when an end-user product (such as the smartphone) incorporates multiple standard-essential patents (SEPs), the aggregate SEP royalty might be so high as to make it infeasible for manufacturers to make a standard-compliant product. 1 A decade's worth of royalty-stacking claims in the academic literature and in patent-infringement litigation begs this question: what is the aggregate royalty actually paid for SEPs used in standard-compliant products-specifically, smartphones?
In 2015, Keith Mallinson, an engineering consultant in the mobile telecommunications industry, supplied an elegantly simple answer. He estimated the total monetary burden that royalties for mobile communications SEPs actually impose on manufacturers of mobile handsets and then compared that aggregate royalty to total global handset revenues for 2014. 2 Mallinson found that the aggregate royalty for 2G, 3G, and 4G SEPs was approximately 5 percent of global handset revenues.
I replicate Mallinson's important study. I am able to confirm his results with publicly available data and my own analysis of a dataset on mobile handset sales in 2013 and 2014. In this article, I first explain Mallinson's methodology. I then separately examine the revenues of major SEP owners, patent pools, large implementers of SEPs, and patent-assertion entities (PAEs). I show that, even using large assumed values for balancing payments group of SEP holders to be less than $6 billion per year. 11 In lieu of using Mallinson's estimate of less than $6 billion, I construct my own empirical model to estimate how much this third group receives in licensing revenues.
II. Major Mobile Communications SEP Holders with Licensing Programs
I begin by compiling the royalty amounts that Alcatel-Lucent, Ericsson, Nokia, InterDigital, and Qualcomm collected in licensing revenues for 2013 and 2014, which is the time frame that Mallinson used for his study. 12 I specifically rely on those five companies' annual reports to calculate the licensing revenues that they earned.
13 Next, I calculate the royalty yield for each company by dividing its licensing revenues by global handset revenues for a given year.
14 It bears emphasis that my estimates-as well as Mallinson's estimates-of licensing revenues for these five companies are conservative (that is, the companies' actual revenues from licensing their mobile communications SEPs are less than Mallinson's and my estimates), because the reported patent-licensing revenues for those five companies "also significantly include licensing for other patents including non-SEPs, SEPs for non-cellular standards including WiFi, video and audio compression, and even non-patent licensing with brands and technology transfer in the case of Nokia, for example."
15 Furthermore, the actual revenues from licensing SEPs (that are essential to mobile communications standards) for those five companies are less than the estimated licensing revenues, because their actual revenues include royalties collected from manufacturers' sales of tablets, PC dongles, and M2M devices in addition to licensing fees collected from manufacturers' sales of handsets.
16 However, to avoid undercounting revenues earned from licensing SEPs, Mallinson and I both divide the estimated licensing revenues by combined global revenues from handset sales, instead of dividing by the 11 Id. at 8. 12 Id. at 
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To replicate Mallinson's study, I also derive maximum yields from publicly listed patent pool fees. Mallinson is unclear in describing how he takes the market-representative tariffs from the royalty rate cards for the three mobile communications SEP patent pools. Consequently, I use my own methodology, though I follow the same logic that I understand Mallinson to employ.
SIPRO, Via Licensing, and Sisvel charge rates for their patent pools on the basis of how many practicing devices each SEP implementer is producing. For example, Table 3 shows Via Licensing's licensing schedule. For example, if an implementer produced 10,000,001 licensed LTE products in a calendar year, that implementer would pay to Via $3.00 per product for the first 500,000 products, $2.55 per product for the next 2,000,000 products (2,500,000 -500,000 = 2,000,000), $2.40 per product for the next 2,500,000 products (5,000,000 -2,500,000 = 2,500,000), $2.25 per product for the next 5,000,000 products (10,000,000 -5,000,000 = 5,000,000), and $2.10 per product for the last product (10,000,001 -10,000,000 = 1). The total royalty for that implementer would be calculated as follows:
($3.00 × 500,000) + ($2.55 × 2,000,000) + ($2.40 × 2,500,000) + ($2.24 ×5,000,000) + ($2.10 × 1) = $23,800,002.10.
Thus, the implementer would pay $23,800,002.10 in total royalties to Via Licensing that year. One can calculate the average patent fee that that imple-menter pays to Via by dividing that total royalty figure by the number of practicing devices that the implementer produced that year: $23,800,002.10 ÷ 10,000,001 = $2.38. Thus, on average, this hypothetical implementer pays Via a royalty of $2.38 per practicing device. Suppose that this value of $2.38 is also the average royalty that all implementers pay to Via per practicing device. If there are 500 million units of 4G LTE devices made in a year, then Via would collect $1.19 billion in royalties for that year ($2.38 × 500 million = $1.19 billion). Suppose further that total global handset revenues are $400 billion in that year. Then, Via Licensing's royalty yield would be 0.30 percent ($1.19 billion ÷ $400 billion = 0.30 percent).
Using data from International Data Corporation (IDC), 26 which documents sales and shipments of handsets by company, I repeat those calculations for all three mobile communications SEP pools. IDC lists how many 3G-or 4G-compliant mobile phones each vendor shipped to all distribution channels or directly to end users in a given year (2013 or 2014), which I use as a proxy for the number of 3G-or 4G-compliant products that each manufacturer produced in 2013 and 2014. I calculate the royalty that each manufacturer pays on average to a given patent pool per practicing device, and I then take the average of those royalties, weighted by the number of 3G-or 4G-compliant devices that each vendor is shipping. Next I multiply that average by the total number of 3G-or 4G-compliant practicing devices made in that year to get the total royalty revenues that the patent pool received in that year. I divide those total royalty revenues by the total global handset revenues for that year to derive the patent pool's royalty yield.
However, the IDC database that I have ends with the third quarter of 2014 (that is, although the number of practicing units that each vendor shipped in 2014 is available, that number represents the number of practicing units that each vendor shipped from the first quarter to the third quarter of 2014). Consequently, the data that I have for 2014 are incomplete. To account for this deficiency in the data, I multiply the quantities of mobile devices shipped in 2014 by 4/3, thereby annualizing the 2014 data. Table 4 reports my results for estimated per-unit royalties charged by patent pools and the implied royalty yield. I have converted all 2013 dollar amounts to 2014 dollars. Note: I use the number of 3G-or 4G-compliant mobile phones shipped as a proxy for the number of 3G-or 4G-compliant mobile phones produced. In 2013 dollars, the patent pool fee per device in 2013 was $1.12 for SIPRO, $2.22 for Via Licensing, and $0.72 for Sisvel.
Thus, I estimate the total royalty yield for patent pools to be 0.45 percent in 2013 and 0.55 percent in 2014. These estimated yields, if anything, overestimate the royalty yield for patent pools, because the assumption underlying my estimations (and also Mallinson's) is that all SEP implementers are paying the listed rate-card prices, which is an assumption that Mallinson calls "highly optimistic."
27 Furthermore, Mallinson says that "the WCDMA patent pool is commonly known to have been a very weak performer over many years," and that it is unlikely that the LTE patent pools collect "half of what the royalty yields imply because they have not been in business long enough to assert themselves."
28 For these reasons, the true royalty yield is likely to be lower than what Mallinson and I each estimate. In other words, my results in Table 4 , and Mallinson's results (reproduced for comparison in Table 5 ), assume that all SEP implementers pay the listed rate-card prices. 27 Mallinson, supra note 2, at 6. 28 Id. Here, I generate my own econometric estimate of the royalties for large implementers on the basis of publicly available information. To this estimate, I add RPX Corporation's estimate of the licensing revenues that publicly traded PAEs collect per year so as to derive the total estimated royalties that Mallinson's third group of SEP holders receives. I first use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the amount that defensive cross licensors-a group in which Mallinson includes Apple, Huawei, RIM, Samsung, and LG 31 -collect in licensing revenues. I do so by exploiting the correlation between SEP holders' shares of patents declared essential to the 4G LTE standard and the share of 4G revenues that holders of patents essential to the 4G LTE standard collect in licensing revenues. That is, I regress the share of 4G revenues that SEP holders collect in licensing revenues on SEP holders' individual shares of all the patents declared essential to the 4G LTE standard. This technique enables me to find the average amount of additional revenue that a company would expect to receive as its share of patents declared essential to the 4G LTE standard increases. I use the results from this regression to predict how much one would expect a cross-licensor to collect in implicit licensing revenues.
32 I use the share of 4G revenues that SEP holders collect in licensing revenues (in 2013 or 2014) as the dependent variable and SEP holders' shares of patents declared essential to the 4G LTE standard as the independent or predictor variable. Each observation in my regression is a separate SEP holder (in 2013 or 2014). I estimate the share of 4G revenues (but not the share of 3G revenues) that SEP holders collect because data on SEP holders' shares of patents declared essential to the 3G standard are unavailable. 
A. Estimating the Implicit Revenues of Large Implementers
In 2013, the Cyber Creative Institute detailed the number of patents (on a patent-family basis) declared essential to the 4G LTE standard by each patent holder. 33 Although I use the Cyber Creative Institute's dataset on declared essential patents by patent holder, this dataset is imperfect in the sense that not every declared essential patent (even on a patent-family basis) is likely to be actually essential to the 4G LTE standard. 34 For my analysis, I assume that the proportions of SEPs contributed to the 4G LTE standard by patent holder would remain the same in 2014-that is, if a report issued in 2013 listed patent holder A as contributing 5 percent of SEPs to the 4G LTE standard, I assume that a report issued in 2014 would still list patent holder A as contributing 5 percent of SEPs to the 4G LTE standard. Put differently, I assume that the shares of SEPs contributed to the 4G LTE standard remain constant from 2013 to 2014. This assumption is justified because the composition of the universe of patents essential to practice a given standard does not change drastically from one year to the next.
I find that the shares of 4G revenues that SEP holders received in 2013 and 2014 are not normally distributed. Consequently, I find that a log-log regression best fits the data, relative to other regression models. Figure 1 plots the linear relationship between the log of the shares of 4G revenues received in 2013 and 2014 and the log of the shares of patents contributed to the 4G LTE standard. I use the log of the shares of 4G revenues received by the five major SEP holders with licensing programs whose licensing revenues I derived in Part I. I derive the share of 4G revenues that those five companies receive by dividing my estimated licensing revenues for those five companies by global 4G revenues, which I estimate to be $175.3 billion in 2013 and $224.0 billion in 2014.
35 If these licensors are better able to exploit the value of their patent portfolio than other licensees, the relationship between portfolio share and revenues that I estimate will tend to overestimate the revenues earned by other patent holders. I have converted all 2013 dollar amounts to 2014 dollars. 34 See, e.g., id. at 16 ("Because patent declarations to ETSI are done voluntarily by each company, no indications are made whether they are really essential and conforming to standards or they are supplementary in the sense that they simply facilitate implementations. Furthermore, the criteria to decide whether a particular patent is essential or not are up to each company, and the decision is made based on the company's own IPR strategy, to make the most of its IPR assets. In addition, ETSI does not evaluate the relevance of the declared patents to the standards."); see also J. Table 6 reports the results from an OLS regression of the natural log of a firm's share of 4G revenues that patent holders received on the natural log of that firm's share of patents contributed to the 4G LTE standard. To account for systematic differences in revenues between the two years, I include a dummy variable indicating whether the observation is from 2014-that is, when the year of the observation is 2013, that indicator variable is equal to zero, whereas it is equal to one when the year of the observation is 2014. In Table 6 , the coefficient on the share of 4G SEPs indicates a positive relationship, which means that an increase in the share of SEPs that a firm contributed to the 4G LTE standard is associated with an increase in that firm's share of 4G revenues received by SEP holders in 2013. That positive relationship is statistically significant at the 99-percent confidence level. Although the five companies reported similar revenue shares in 2013 and 2014, the negative value of the coefficient for the year dummy-which is not statistically significant at the 90-percent confidence level-indicates that average revenues were lower in 2014. Including both years in the regression allows one to measure more accurately the average revenues that a company could expect to earn if it owns a given share of patents essential to the standard. I find similar results if I estimate separate regressions for each year.
The R2 for the regression in Table 6 is 0.701, which indicates that the share of SEPs contributed to the 4G LTE standard explains more than two-thirds of the variation of the share of 4G revenues that the SEP holders received. Furthermore, the F statistic is significant at the 95-percent confidence level, which implies that the regression model predicts the share of 4G revenues that SEP holders received more accurately than the average share of 4G revenues that SEP holders received would predict on its own.
Given the small sample size, one should interpret Table 6 's estimates with caution. However, the small sample size should not be a reason to discount the regression results. Although only five companies' revenues and patent shares are included in the regression, those five companies contributed 36.7 percent of all patents contributed to the 4G LTE standard. 37 To the extent that the publicly available information on the revenue shares of these companies allows me to estimate an upper bound on the revenue of all SEP holders, I am able to test the size of the aggregate royalty that publicly available information can support. That is, although I predict a point estimate for the implied revenues of each SEP holder, the chief goal of this analysis is to determine whether it is possible for publicly available data to support a finding of a burdensome amount of aggregate royalties, using assumptions favorable to finding the existence of a royalty burden that would thwart implementation of the standard by manufacturers of handsets.
Because both my dependent variables and independent variables are natural logs, the regression coefficient for the share of SEPs contributed to the 4G LTE standard should be interpreted as an elasticity, or the percentage change in the share of revenues as the share of contributed patents increases by one percent. 38 For example, if the share of SEPs that an SEP holder contributes to the 4G LTE standard increases by 1 percent, my regression results predict that the share of 4G revenues that that SEP holder receives in licensing revenues would increase by 1.861 percent in 2013, and by 1.552 percent in 2014 (that is, 1.861 -0.309 = 1.552). That my regression results from Table 6 have a high R2 and a high F statistic suggests that using the share of SEPs contributed to the 4G LTE standard to predict the portion of 4G revenues that SEP holders are collecting in 2013 and 2014 will provide more accurate results than simply using the average share of revenues.
Thus, I use the regression coefficients to estimate the predicted implicit revenues that defensive cross licensors could expect to receive in 2013 and 2014. I multiply the natural log of a given patent holder's share of patents contributed to the 4G LTE standard by 1.861, and then add -0.449 (the constant term) to derive the predicted log of the share of 4G revenues received in 2013. For 2014, I do the same calculation, but I also add -0.309 (the regression coefficient for the 2014 dummy variable) to my predicted log of the share of 4G revenues. From the predicted share of 4G revenues received, I can then derive the predicted revenues received and the predicted royalty yield. Table 7 reports my process for calculating the predicted implicit revenues received in 2013 and 2014 by large implementers, as well as the predicted royalty yields. 175,254,828,440 in 2013 and $224,122,858,176 in 2014. I calculate global handset revenues to be $384,659,251,261 in 2013 and $384,956,220,857 in 2014. As Table 7 reports, my estimate of the total implicit licensing revenues collected in 2013 by large implementers that cross license-Apple, Huawei, RIM, Samsung, and LG-is $3.96 billion, which amounts to 1.03 percent of global licensing revenues in 2013. Table 7 also reports that my estimate of the total implicit licensing revenues collected in 2014 by Apple, Huawei, RIM, Samsung, and LG is $3.72 billion, which amounts to 0.97 percent of global licensing revenues in 2014.
B. Estimating the Aggregate Royalty for Mallinson' s Third Group of SEP Holders
Mallinson's estimate of less than $6 billion collected in licensing revenues per year for his third group of SEP holders included revenues from PAEs and NPEs as well as large implementers. To estimate the amount that PAEs collect in licensing revenues, I rely on a 2014 report by RPX Corporation on publicly traded PAEs.
39 RPX reported that publicly traded PAEs collected $969 million in royalty revenues in 2013 and $1,197 million in 2014. 40 Table 8 reports my estimate of the royalties for Mallinson's third group of SEP holders, which includes large implementers and PAEs. I also show the upper and lower bounds for the predicted implicit revenues of large implementers at the 95-percent confidence level. The estimate for the amount that PAEs collect in licensing revenues is the same for the lower bound, average, and upper bounds. Although the upper bound leads to a high royalty yield for large implementers and PAEs, it bears emphasis that the upper bound represents an extreme value and that the actual value is likely to be closer to the mean estimate, which is 1.46 percent in 2014. I report the upper and lower bounds to show that even the highest reasonable estimate of the royalty yield for Mallinson's third group of SEP holders was only 3.83 percent in 2013 and 3.66 percent in 2014. It is highly unlikely that large implementers would have a higher royalty yield from cross-licenses than large SEP holders (such as Qualcomm or Ericsson) collect. 41 In this analysis, I have made a number of reasoned assumptions. First, I assume that relationship between the share of patents contributed to the 4G LTE standards and the share of licensing revenues received is linear. If, instead, the share of revenues increases more quickly as the number of patents increases for SEP holders with few SEPs than for SEP holders with many SEPs, then my regression model would underestimate the amounts that small implementers are receiving. In other words, it might be argued that the relationship between patents contributed and revenues received is stronger (that is, more positive) for companies with smaller portfolios than it is for companies with larger portfolios.
Second, I assume that it is reasonable to exclude implementers with small numbers of declared essential patents (like Airbiquity, which has contributed five patents to the 4G LTE standard) in my estimated royalties for Mallinson's third group of SEP holders. Cyber Creative Institute, supra note 33, at 6 fig.1 . This exclusion could bias my estimate towards a lower value. I do not include those implement- My findings in Table 9 are similar to Mallinson's in Table 10 . My findings for the first two groups differ slightly in size from Mallinson's, although not in a meaningful way. These differences likely arise because of assumptions made in the application of quantity discounts, or differences in the underlying production and sales data. For the third group, I applied a different method than Mallinson but again find that his results are reasonable. My analysis-and Mallinson's analysis in Table 10 -shows that the aggregate royalty collected by SEP holders is approximately 4 to 5 percent of global handset revenues.
VI. Conclusion
It has taken a decade for the royalty-stacking conjecture to be subjected to a simple test of its factual plausibility: if SEP holders have indeed been imposing excessive aggregate royalties on SEP implementers, one should be able to observe those excessive royalties in the SEP holders' publicly reported licensing revenues relative to global handset revenues. Keith Mallinson had this insight in 2015 and found no evidence to support the existence of an excessive aggregate royalty. My replication of Mallinson's analysis confirms his conclusion. Using publicly available information, I find that SEP holders collected aggregate royalties in 2013 and 2014 that were between 4 and 5 percent of global handset revenues.
